This is the second in a series of posts in which I will attempt to convey my view of the current LCS and DDG-1000 shipbuilding programs that I believe have the potential to add important contributions to future surface combatants. I have decided to address the LCS speed requirement first because I believe that this is one of the more troubling aspects of this program, but I do not believe (as many others) that the speed requirement was as entirely misplaced as it is commonly described.
First some context. The LCS threshold and objective speed key performance parameters were 40 kts and 50 kts respectively. I have not had the pleasure of reading the CONOPS of the LCS in the requirements documents, so I find it a little challenging to analyze whether this speed requirement is truly a misguided requirement as many claim.
One aspect of the speed requirement that is really not up for debate is the fact that this feature has constrained the designs of the ship to some degree as well as being some level of cost driver for the program. The issue with constraining the design is that the speed requirement certainly impacted other trade-space for the design, and it would be interesting to be privy to the accomodations that had to be made to other systems to meet the speed requirement. The impact on cost is not clear from the publicly available information but I assume that it had some negative impact that resulted in some level of cost growth. That said, I believe that other aspects of the acquisition process (such as introducing the requirement to conform to ABS Naval Vessel Rules relatively late in the design process) are probably greater cost drivers for the ships than the speed requirement.
Many commentators seem convinced that the LCS speed requirement will not offer enough return on investment in terms of operational capability to justify the expense. This is probably true, but without seeing the CONOPS it is not possible to make anything other than an educated speculation in this regard. That said, I will leave you with the following thoughts.
First, the LCS speed requirement has resulted in a relatively unique hull design for PCU Independence (LCS 2). This kind of innovation should be viewed as a positive development as the Navy moves forward.
Finally, an ocean transit of 2500 nautical miles (approximately the transit distance from Norfolk, VA to the Panama Canal), the difference in arrival times assuming the following speed of advance figures are shown below:
35 knots: 71.4 hours -or- 2 days 23.4 hours
25 knots: 100.0 hours -or- 4 days 4.0 hours
At the pace of modern contingency operations, does 1 day and 4.6 hours make a difference to the COCOM. If the problem were mines, and given the economic impact of shipping through the Panama Canal the answer is probably yes.
V/R,






