This is the second in a series of posts in which I will attempt to convey my view of the current LCS and DDG-1000 shipbuilding programs that I believe have the potential to add important contributions to future surface combatants. I have decided to address the LCS speed requirement first because I believe that this is one of the more troubling aspects of this program, but I do not believe (as many others) that the speed requirement was as entirely misplaced as it is commonly described.
First some context. The LCS threshold and objective speed key performance parameters were 40 kts and 50 kts respectively. I have not had the pleasure of reading the CONOPS of the LCS in the requirements documents, so I find it a little challenging to analyze whether this speed requirement is truly a misguided requirement as many claim.
One aspect of the speed requirement that is really not up for debate is the fact that this feature has constrained the designs of the ship to some degree as well as being some level of cost driver for the program. The issue with constraining the design is that the speed requirement certainly impacted other trade-space for the design, and it would be interesting to be privy to the accomodations that had to be made to other systems to meet the speed requirement. The impact on cost is not clear from the publicly available information but I assume that it had some negative impact that resulted in some level of cost growth. That said, I believe that other aspects of the acquisition process (such as introducing the requirement to conform to ABS Naval Vessel Rules relatively late in the design process) are probably greater cost drivers for the ships than the speed requirement.
Many commentators seem convinced that the LCS speed requirement will not offer enough return on investment in terms of operational capability to justify the expense. This is probably true, but without seeing the CONOPS it is not possible to make anything other than an educated speculation in this regard. That said, I will leave you with the following thoughts.
First, the LCS speed requirement has resulted in a relatively unique hull design for PCU Independence (LCS 2). This kind of innovation should be viewed as a positive development as the Navy moves forward.
Finally, an ocean transit of 2500 nautical miles (approximately the transit distance from Norfolk, VA to the Panama Canal), the difference in arrival times assuming the following speed of advance figures are shown below:
35 knots: 71.4 hours -or- 2 days 23.4 hours
25 knots: 100.0 hours -or- 4 days 4.0 hours
At the pace of modern contingency operations, does 1 day and 4.6 hours make a difference to the COCOM. If the problem were mines, and given the economic impact of shipping through the Panama Canal the answer is probably yes.
V/R,
Hi,
ReplyDeleteOne question on the issue of speed...
LCS-2 can (reportedly) make 4,300nm at a 20+ knot cruise speed.
If it can only make it 1,000-1,500nm (program specifications) at sprint speed, how much time and effort does it cost to arrange for refueling en route? At 35 knots, can it make it 2,500nm?
Or, worse, how much time does it take to divert to a port for refueling and then get back underway? If you're running the two sides of the triangle at 35 knots while a sister ship powers along the hypotenuse at 25 knots, who gets there first?
While I loved the HSV-2 design, it was a sprinter, not a marathoner (great for regional efforts, not so great for longer distances). On the scale of utility of speed vs a need to travel long distances, is the added weight, engineering and cost worth it?
CBD,
ReplyDeleteYour points are well taken.
The question of the speed requirement levied on the LCS program is the most problematic from my perspective.
I am not personally convinced that the utility of speed when weighed against the cost, schedule, and performance of the program in general was "worth it."
What I do know, is that most of the discussion of the assumed to be misplaced requirement for speed has ignored some inconvenient realities. Speed does play a role in getting to the area of concern in time to effect the eventual outcome. The entering assumption in the previous statement is that the logistics tail will be available to keep the deviation from PIM at a minimum.
All things being equal (which they obviously are not), more speed rather than less would be a better solution. Unfortunately we live in a much more complex reality, and the trade-space is constrained by that reality.
I strongly suspect that the assumption of an appropriate logistics tail was not well considered by the USN, but you have to ask yourself if this is a legitimate reason to truncate the program. I suspect that it is not a good reason, and TTP can be adapted to accommodate the ships that we've dealt ourselves.
V/R,
Quite fair.
ReplyDeleteAs you stated, a ship meant to conduct combat operations (including the support of rapid response forces) is better served by a 35 knot than a 25 knot capability. The added flexibility of high speed allows for a force to be more responsive and flexible on its deployments.
I just wonder at the differential benefit between 35 knots and 40+ knots (or 50 knots). If it were possible to downgrade the equipment on LCS-2 to allow for a top speed in the range of 35 knots, how much volume could be shifted to fuel storage?
We’re already quite deeply invested in the LCS program, so my interest is (in our, non-ideal world) making some lemonade out of lemons.
The large payload space of the LCS-2 gives it a significant added utility beyond the benefits of its speedy hull. The large landing deck and large space beneath give it the means of supporting a variety of missions in an expeditionary manner.
I see the LCS program’s speed addition as the result of conflated principles in the design process. The Street Fighter concept called for a small, fast reconfigurable ship (<<1,000t) with a speed requirement of 50 knots and, separately, a much larger mothership vessel with various payload bays and the ability to support and reconfigure the small ‘fighter’ boats as well as air assets. These two requirements were pushed together into the LCS program…not a great move, but we’ve still got a mothership out of the LCS-2 platform.
If the LCS-2 could make 2,500nm at 35 knots (with the increased fuel capacity), versus 1,500 at 45, then you have a real fast-reaction capability. If one desired such a rapid response capability, the conversion of some JHSV vessels to high speed oilers could support the rapid reaction force until the more conventional support vessels (T-AO/T-AKE/T-AOE) arrived on station (in the company of more capable surface vessels).
Such a CONOPS would best utilize the high speed of these vessels and would accommodate their weaknesses without blunting their strengths.
What do you think?