30 December 2009
08 December 2009
06 December 2009
04 December 2009
Scrapping A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower?
Over at Information Dissemination, The Conservative Wahoo is wondering if the USN should “Scrap the Maritime Strategy?” The primary objection raised is the affordability of the fleet composition required to implement the strategy/vision as outlined in CS-21.
I would like to challenge the notion that the USN cannot afford the fleet required to execute the vision embodied in CS-21.
It is true that the Navy is at a difficult crossroads due to apparent fiscal constraints regarding fleet composition. It is also clear that we cannot afford the Navy vision of a 313 ship navy by continuing to build the platforms that were outlined in the last publically available 30 year shipbuilding plan. The bright spot is that the concept of modularity that will ultimately be proven viable (and correct) by the LCS platforms combined with the intellectual capital in terms of technology development based on the R&D investment in the DDG-1000 provide the Navy a unique opportunity (at just the right crossroads moment) to be able to afford both the 313 ship navy as well as getting the fleet composition more balanced in order to address the vision outlined in CS-21. Whether the Navy capitalizes on this opportunity or not is still open for debate.
In discussing future fleet compositions (whatever shape they may take), Information Dissemination again weighs in with “Reconfigurable and Customizable - But Communication is the Key”. This post captures almost perfectly the lens through which the discussion should be viewed.
From a technical perspective, the USN will have achieved the 80%-90% engineering solution to HM&E and distributed HM&E systems required to move forward upon completion of the DDG-1000. Now I don't happen to think that the DDG-1000 hull is the correct solution, but if you look across the spectrum of hull forms that compose the fleet today, I strongly believe that the USN can pick three hulls (small, medium, and large) that will meet the needs of the USN for the next three decades if not longer. With the introduction of the integrated propulsion system (IPS) from the DDG-1000 development effort, the USN also has an extremely flexible solution for distributed HM&E ship systems and the interfaces with combat systems combined with the opportunity to drive commonality across platforms.
If I were king for a day, I would force the Navy pick three hull forms for surface combatants (small medium and large) with distributed HM&E systems centered on the DDG-1000 IPS solution. I would drive commonality of parts across the three platforms ruthlessly (and I mean ruthlessly in a Rickover like fashion). The designs would not be optimized for a particular combat system solution (like DDG-1000), but the metrics optimized would be weight, cube, and electrical power reservations while maintaining a focus on managing the interfaces between HM&E systems and any future combat systems to be modularly added.
These three HM&E options then define the boxes that Galrahn describes in “Reconfigurable and Customizable - But Communication is the Key”. They would also provide the added advantage of maintaining flexibility to truly modularize combat systems, C4ISR, radars, manpower, small boats, missiles, guns, ESM, etc. This flexibility does not currently exist in the fleet with the exception LCS and to a lesser degree the large deck amphibious ships and CVNs.
If executed correctly, the ship will become analogous to an iPhone (the platform) that is ready to accept the applications (the modules) with a great deal of commonality in the HM&E systems. The commonality is key because it will impact the entire integrated logistics support infrastructure (training, spare parts, repair procedures, technical manuals, etc.) that the Navy is currently wasting tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars on every year due to un-common cross platform systems. For example, there is no rational reason that there should be tens if not hundreds of firemain valve variants throughout the fleet, and the money the USN is wasting on this overly fat logistics tail is epic.
It's not that we can't afford the fleet called for in CS-21. It is just that the USN is not executing the shipbuilding plan required to get there. I would support a decision to reevaluate CS-21 if the world and projected threats have changed enough to alter the vision. I think it would be incorrect to change the vision if the reason is that the USN apparently cannot afford to build the fleet to execute the vision. I for one support the vision laid out in CS-21, and I believe that it represents the values of the American people so it is the right path to follow. Now we all need to check our egos at the door and figure out how to properly execute our responsibility to those values in a fiscally responsible manner.
V/R,
I would like to challenge the notion that the USN cannot afford the fleet required to execute the vision embodied in CS-21.
It is true that the Navy is at a difficult crossroads due to apparent fiscal constraints regarding fleet composition. It is also clear that we cannot afford the Navy vision of a 313 ship navy by continuing to build the platforms that were outlined in the last publically available 30 year shipbuilding plan. The bright spot is that the concept of modularity that will ultimately be proven viable (and correct) by the LCS platforms combined with the intellectual capital in terms of technology development based on the R&D investment in the DDG-1000 provide the Navy a unique opportunity (at just the right crossroads moment) to be able to afford both the 313 ship navy as well as getting the fleet composition more balanced in order to address the vision outlined in CS-21. Whether the Navy capitalizes on this opportunity or not is still open for debate.
In discussing future fleet compositions (whatever shape they may take), Information Dissemination again weighs in with “Reconfigurable and Customizable - But Communication is the Key”. This post captures almost perfectly the lens through which the discussion should be viewed.
From a technical perspective, the USN will have achieved the 80%-90% engineering solution to HM&E and distributed HM&E systems required to move forward upon completion of the DDG-1000. Now I don't happen to think that the DDG-1000 hull is the correct solution, but if you look across the spectrum of hull forms that compose the fleet today, I strongly believe that the USN can pick three hulls (small, medium, and large) that will meet the needs of the USN for the next three decades if not longer. With the introduction of the integrated propulsion system (IPS) from the DDG-1000 development effort, the USN also has an extremely flexible solution for distributed HM&E ship systems and the interfaces with combat systems combined with the opportunity to drive commonality across platforms.
If I were king for a day, I would force the Navy pick three hull forms for surface combatants (small medium and large) with distributed HM&E systems centered on the DDG-1000 IPS solution. I would drive commonality of parts across the three platforms ruthlessly (and I mean ruthlessly in a Rickover like fashion). The designs would not be optimized for a particular combat system solution (like DDG-1000), but the metrics optimized would be weight, cube, and electrical power reservations while maintaining a focus on managing the interfaces between HM&E systems and any future combat systems to be modularly added.
These three HM&E options then define the boxes that Galrahn describes in “Reconfigurable and Customizable - But Communication is the Key”. They would also provide the added advantage of maintaining flexibility to truly modularize combat systems, C4ISR, radars, manpower, small boats, missiles, guns, ESM, etc. This flexibility does not currently exist in the fleet with the exception LCS and to a lesser degree the large deck amphibious ships and CVNs.
If executed correctly, the ship will become analogous to an iPhone (the platform) that is ready to accept the applications (the modules) with a great deal of commonality in the HM&E systems. The commonality is key because it will impact the entire integrated logistics support infrastructure (training, spare parts, repair procedures, technical manuals, etc.) that the Navy is currently wasting tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars on every year due to un-common cross platform systems. For example, there is no rational reason that there should be tens if not hundreds of firemain valve variants throughout the fleet, and the money the USN is wasting on this overly fat logistics tail is epic.
It's not that we can't afford the fleet called for in CS-21. It is just that the USN is not executing the shipbuilding plan required to get there. I would support a decision to reevaluate CS-21 if the world and projected threats have changed enough to alter the vision. I think it would be incorrect to change the vision if the reason is that the USN apparently cannot afford to build the fleet to execute the vision. I for one support the vision laid out in CS-21, and I believe that it represents the values of the American people so it is the right path to follow. Now we all need to check our egos at the door and figure out how to properly execute our responsibility to those values in a fiscally responsible manner.
V/R,
Labels:
DDG-1000,
LCS,
Mission Modules,
Shipbuilding
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